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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, I examine the impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on 
defamation law in New Zealand. The topic turned out to be a continuation of my previous 
work on how the common law could be, and is being, modified in ways which minimise 
potential chilling effects on freedom of expression. Here I discuss the recent extension of the 
defence of qualified privilege in both jurisdictions, in the New Zealand Lange cases,1 and in 
the very recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Torstar case.2
The common law, the essential elements of which were medieval English customs,
 To my delight, 
it is also a story of how the common law, (with a little help from statute), is constantly 
reinvigorating and reinventing itself, not only within separate jurisdictions, but also between 
them – essentially a rich, robust process of fertilisation and cross-fertilisation of ideas, 
analysis and experience.  
3 survived 
political and constitutional crises, civil wars, and violence and disorder, to become a law of 
the world by adoption, together with the language, into the British colonies.4 By then it was 
generally accepted to be the laws as stated by the judges, otherwise known as case law, 
bolstered and reinforced by a system of precedent. In such a system, principles of law are 
derived from decisions in actual cases, but, as Oliver Wendell Holmes explains, each new 
decision must follow syllogistically from existing precedents.5
                                                          
∗  Associate Professor of Law, University of Canterbury. My thanks to Sarah Keast, who carried 
out the background research for this project. 
 Naturally, such a system 
carries within it the inherent risk of becoming frozen in time, and so Holmes reveals what he 
1  Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC);  Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA) (Lange 
No. 1); Lange v Atkinson [2000] 1 NZLR 257 (PC); Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA) (Lange No. 
2). 
2  Grant v Torstar Corp 2009 SCC 6, (22 December 2009). 
3  Arthur R Hogue, Origins of the Common Law, (Indiana University Press: 1966), 227. 
4  Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, (Beacon Press, 1963), Ch 1; Hogue above, n. 3, 
235. 
5  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, (Little, Brown and Company, 1923), 35.  
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refers to as the ‘secret root’ of the common law.  The judges, he suggests, are too wise to 
‘sacrifice good sense to a syllogism.’  Hence, when case law principles become antique and 
decrepit ‘new reasons more fitted to the time have been found for them, …they gradually 
receive a new content, and at last a new form, from the grounds to which they have been 
transplanted.’6
Thus, New Zealand common law, transplanted from the United Kingdom, has been 
transformed. Sir Ivor Richardson has noted the dramatic fall in the citation of English 
decisions as a striking feature of the fifty year history of our permanent Court of Appeal.
  Importantly, however, this new form has to come from somewhere other than 
the inside of a judge’s skull. Good common law judges are constantly looking outside of 
themselves and outside of legal rules established over the centuries to give context to their 
judgments. In this country they will look to other New Zealand cases, and comparatively to 
similar cases in other jurisdictions where relevant. 
7 
This he puts down to the increasing prominence of indigenous statute law, and a substantial 
increase in the body of New Zealand case law available for citation since 1960.8 Although Sir 
Ivor notes a third development, being our heightened sense of independent nationhood and of 
our ability to shape our own law independently assisted by the ease of drawing on 
developments elsewhere,9
A mark of maturing independence is a continuing interest in the experience of others. In the 
first 30 years of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, we tended to favour our nearest 
neighbour, Australia, when citing overseas cases. That has also changed. Whereas Canadian, 
American and international decisions hardly registered before 1990, now they do, quite 
significantly.
 I prefer to see increasing independence as a natural driver of the 
other developments already noted.  
10
                                                          
6  Holmes notes: ‘… just as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some earlier 
creature to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive in the law long after the use they 
once served is at an end and the reason for them has been forgotten’. See above, n. 5, 35-36.  
 Sir Ivor Richardson suggests this is because of increasing recognition being 
7  ‘The Permanent Court of Appeal: Surveying the 50 years’, in The Permanent New Zealand 
Court of Appeal: Essays on the First 50 Years, Ed Rick Bigwood, (Hart Publishing, 2009), 297, 309.  
8  Ibid, 310-311.  
9  Ibid, 310. 
10  Ibid, 311. In 2007, the figure was almost 5 percent of cases cited by the Court of Appeal.  See 
also Jeremy Finn, ‘Sometimes Persuasive Authority: Dominion Case Law and English Judges, 1895-
1970,’ in The Grand Experiment – Law and Legal Culture in British Settler Societies, Eds Hamar Foster, 
Benjamin L Berger, and A R Buck (UBCPress, 2008), 101.  
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given to international human rights and treaties, and reflects the experience and receptiveness 
of our increasingly travelled judges and lawyers.11
The discussion of the Lange cases and Torstar which follows demonstrates that these two 
cases have all these features. I will suggest that the most recent advances within the common 
law of defamation in New Zealand, in which new reasoning has been found, and new content 
and forms developed, appear to be significantly influenced by the Canadian Charter and by 
the contemporaneous development of human rights jurisprudence in a number of 
jurisdictions. More than this, I will suggest the New Zealand jurisprudence has played a 
significant part in recent development of Canadian defamation law. Like Holmes, I regard 
this as a process of growth, where law always approaches, but never quite reaches, 
consistency. To adapt Holmes, the common law ‘… is forever adopting new principles from 
[national and international] life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history at the 
other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off.’
 
12
2. Freedom of expression, the Bill of Rights and defamation in New Zealand 
 
Of course, freedom of expression13 existed as a right prior to the enactment of the New 
Zealand of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill,)14 but this ‘über-right’ and indeed, all of the rights in 
the Bill, were both confirmed and preserved by it.15 However, bills of rights can and should 
be transformative,16
                                                          
11  Ibid.  
 moving areas of the common law which impact on rights in directions 
hitherto neglected, or allowing development of more sophisticated principle to occur at a 
speedier pace. In short, although freedom of expression could have been taken account of by 
New Zealand courts prior to 1990, the enactment of the Bill has elevated the rights 
consciousness of the general public, the media and the legal fraternity in New Zealand. This 
has flowed through into the case law, although not consistently. The Lange decisions, 
12  Above, n. 5, 36. 
13   See the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14: Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind 
in any form. 
14  See Lange No 1, n. 1 above, 460-461. See also s. 28 of the Bill. 
15  See the long title to the Bill: a) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in New Zealand; also s. 2 and Paul Rishworth in Rishworth P, Huscroft G, 
Optican S and Mahoney R, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (OUP, 2003). 
31. 
16  Ibid. 
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however, are powerful examples of real transformation, although the rights discourse is not as 
developed as it would be in Canada.  
2.1 Basis of defamation law 
In this jurisdiction, defamation is principally a civil wrong that gives the injured party a right 
to claim substantial damages. The action has been the branch of the law that the media fear 
most. Although my own work has demonstrated that concerns about the chilling effects of 
defamation law are somewhat overstated in New Zealand,17
 
 it is true that damages in 
defamation cases can be high, especially if the plaintiff is a well-known person with a 
substantial reputation to lose. Defamation proceedings can be unpredictable because not only 
are some of the rules vague, but also defamation trials are often with a jury, which must 
determine many of the important issues, sometimes with unexpected results. Furthermore, 
there are very technical rules of pleading requiring specialist legal advice. In general, the 
requirements of the tort are still regarded by some as overly plaintiff-friendly. 
The Defamation Act 1992 was an attempt to simplify and rationalise this branch of the law, 
but whether this object has been achieved remains unclear. Although the statute has refined 
certain elements of the law and offers some new remedies, it is still basically a common law 
subject,18
 
- for example, the definition of ‘defamation’ remains untouched. It is necessary to 
look to the case law, including that from the United Kingdom and Australia and other 
common law jurisdictions.  
Furthermore, in relation to defences, any privilege of the media to report statements that are 
untrue is a qualified privilege only. Here, the occasion, rather than the speaker or publisher, is 
protected. Thus, to attract common law qualified privilege, publication must be made only to 
persons who have an ‘interest or duty’ to receive it, which is known as the ‘shared interest 
test’. Usually excessive publication will not be privileged, and usually, national and 
international publication by the media is seen as excessive. Therefore, the most profound 
                                                          
17  See ‘Myths and Realities about the chilling effect: The New Zealand media’s experience of 
defamation law’ (2005) 13 Torts Law Journal 259; ‘Defamation in New Zealand and Its Effects on the 
Media – Self-Censorship or Occupational Hazard?’, [2006] NZLRev 467-524;  ‘The Chilling Effect – 
Defamation and the Bill of Rights’, Law, Liberty, Legislation: Essays In Honour of John Burrows QC, 
LexisNexis, (2008, J Finn and S Todd, eds). 
18   See generally for the following: J Burrows and U Cheer, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 
2005, OUP) Chs 2-3. 
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development in recent years in relation to defences  in defamation has been the appearance of 
an extended form of qualified privilege applying to a particular form of political statements 
which are published widely. I now turn to explain why in Lange the courts rebalanced the 
equation somewhat in favour of defendants, using freedom of expression discourse and to 
some extent, our Canadian-influenced Bill of Rights. 
 
2.2 The Lange decisions 
In Lange v. Atkinson19 David Lange, former New Zealand Prime Minister and former leader 
of the New Zealand Labour Party, sued Mr Joe Atkinson, a lecturer in political studies at the 
University of Auckland, and the publishers of the magazine, North and South, over an article 
and cartoon in which Mr Atkinson criticised Mr Lange’s record as prime minister and 
compared his performance as party leader unfavourably with that of current leaders. The 
defendant pleaded both ordinary qualified privilege and a new defence called political 
discussion, relying on Australian developments.20 Justice Elias in the High Court 
reconsidered the existing defence of common law qualified privilege, and held that, contrary 
to the previous position, factually inaccurate political discussion might be protected by it.21  
The only precondition of availability tentatively suggested by the judge was a requirement of 
honest belief in what was published.22
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, and in Lange No 1 
  
23 that Court decided 
that qualified privilege may protect a statement which is published generally, and covers 
statements which directly concern the functioning of representative and responsible 
government. Like the High Court, the Court of Appeal decided not to require a standard of 
reasonable behaviour when publishing political statements. The defence failed only if the 
plaintiff proved that the defendant was predominantly motivated by ill will towards the 
plaintiff or otherwise took improper advantage of the occasion of publication.24
                                                          
19   [1997] 2 NZLR 22. 
 Ill will is 
20  In Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the High Court of Australia had extended 
the categories of qualified privilege to protect a communication made to the public on a government 
or political matter: (1997) 71 ALJR 818. See also Andrew Kenyon, ‘Lange and Reynolds Qualified 
Privilege: Australian and English Defamation Law and Practice, [2004] MULR 13. 
21   Lange above n. 19, 45-46. 
22   Ibid, 49. 
23  Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424. 
24  Previously malice, now set out in the Defamation Act 1992, s 19. Section 19(1)  provides: In 
any proceedings for defamation, a defence of qualified privilege shall fail if the plaintiff proves that, 
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established if it is shown the defendant did not believe what was published, or published the 
matter recklessly, not caring whether or not the words are true.  
The decision was appealed to the Privy Council,25  and was heard at the same time that the 
equivalent English decision, Reynolds v Times Newspapers26
At this point, however, the attempted influence of the ‘old country’ was resisted to some 
extent and we see the New Zealand court maintaining independence while at the same time, 
drawing on other common law jurisdictions to a limited extent. Thus, in Lange No 2, the 
Court of Appeal affirmed its previous decision, but went on to elucidate and delimit it.
 was heard by the House of 
Lords, by the same judges: Lords Nicholls, Steyn, Hope, Hobhouse, and Cooke, the latter 
from New Zealand. The Board recorded its anxiety that the New Zealand Courts had reached 
their decisions without being able to consider the House of Lords’ decision in Reynolds. It 
therefore strongly suggested the New Zealand Court of Appeal would wish to take Reynolds 
into account and took the unusual course of allowing the appeal and remitting the matter back 
to New Zealand for further hearing.  
27 The 
Court summarised its conclusions about the defence of qualified privilege as it applies to 
political statements which are published generally as follows:28
(1) The defence of qualified privilege may be available in respect of a statement which is 
published generally. 
 
(2) The nature of New Zealand’s democracy means that the wider public may have a 
proper interest in respect of generally-published statements which directly concern the 
functioning of representative and responsible government, including statements about the 
performance or possible future performance of specific individuals in elected public 
office. 
(3) In particular, a proper interest does exist in respect of statements made about the 
actions and qualities of those currently or formerly elected to Parliament and those with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in publishing the matter that is the subject of the proceedings, the defendant was predominantly 
motivated by ill will towards the plaintiff, or otherwise took improper advantage of the occasion of 
publication. 
25   Lange v. Atkinson [2000] 1 NZLR 257 (PC). 
26  [1999] 4 All ER 609. 
27   Lange v. Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385. 
28   Ibid, at 390-391 and 400. 
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immediate aspirations to such office, so far as those actions and qualities directly affect or 
affected their capacity (including their personal ability and willingness) to meet their 
public responsibilities.  
(4) The determination of the matters which bear on that capacity will depend on a 
consideration of what is properly a matter of public concern rather than of private 
concern. 
(5) The width of the identified public concern justifies the extent of the publication. 
(6) To attract privilege the statement must be published on a qualifying occasion. 
Therefore, the privilege is a generic one attaching to subject-matter coming within the 
category of discussion about MPs past, present or future. It does not require an examination 
of the circumstances of publication (in particular, of media behaviour) in each case before 
determining whether the occasion is to be treated as one of qualified privilege (as was 
decided in Reynolds in the United Kingdom, discussed further below).29 In New Zealand, 
once a factual matrix passes through the subject matter gateway, section 19 of the 
Defamation Act provides protection against press irresponsibility by mandating loss of the 
defence if ill will or misuse of the opportunity to publish exists.30
2.3 The Lange decisions and the Bill of Rights – the Canadian influence 
 
The Lange case reveals Charter influence both directly and indirectly. By this, I mean the 
judgments make reference to the New Zealand Bill of Rights (modelled on the Canadian 
Charter), and all the judges use general freedom of expression discourse in the form of 
discussion of potential chilling effects flowing from defamation law. I intend to discuss these 
references but will first briefly address the prior question of whether the Bill of Rights can 
and should apply to areas of private law such as defamation 
There is no statutory requirement to carry out a human rights or bill of rights analysis in 
relation to actions between private citizens.  New Zealand’s Bill was intended to have only 
vertical effects: it applies to the three branches of Government and bodies exercising public 
                                                          
29  Ibid, 400. 
30  See n. 24 above. 
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functions,31 and thus in general only protects private citizens from the state.32 In spite of this, 
it is clear that a process of constitutionalisation of our private law is ongoing. Although there 
some disagreement,33 the New Zealand judiciary appears to accept it must take account of the 
rights in the Bill somehow when resolving disputes between private citizens and when 
developing the common law.34 Because this process does not produce directly enforceable 
rights, the horizontal effect is usually regarded as weakly or strongly indirect.35
The question of horizontal effect of New Zealand’s Bill of Rights cannot be fully explored 
here. However, I consider that the argument of Rishworth and others that indirect 
horizontality in the common law is not only inevitable, but desirable,
 In New 
Zealand, it is given content in two ways: by arguing that judges are simply bound by the Bill 
as the judicial arm of the state, or by arguing that judges are implicitly required to take 
account of the values expressed in the Bill of Rights. The judiciary appears to endorse or use 
both approaches. It will become apparent below that similar approaches are taken in Canada, 
and indeed, were applied by the Supreme Court in Torstar. 
36 is compelling, and 
opposing arguments to be rather arid. Defamation claims are suffused with a very high 
level of public interest which implicates the state as well as the individual private citizens 
involved. Lepofsky correctly suggests that there are public interest values on both sides of 
the equation. The value of a person’s good name and reputation goes to personal dignity 
and worth as a human being,37
                                                          
31  The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3. 
 but also allows us to interact socially, to survive 
32  See Paul Rishworth, ‘Human Rights’, (2005) (1) NZLRev 87. 
33  Ibid, and see Andrew Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effects of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as 
Applied in Hosking v Runting’, (2004) 4 New Zealand Law Review 681. 
34  Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, (2007, 3rd ed), 1176. 
See also Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television New Zealand Ltd [2008] NZCA 350, [89]. Various 
approaches seem to have been accepted in the United Kingdom also – see eg: Jonathon Morgan, 
‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble,’ [2003] Cambridge LJ 444; Gavin 
Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy Under the 
Human Rights Act’, (2003) Modern Law Review 726, McKennitt v Ash [2005] EMLR 10, para [49], 
Murray v Express Newspapers plc(2) Big Pictures (UK) Limited [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch), para [18], and 
see Phillipson’s view of von Hannover in ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and Strasbourg compared’, 
New Dimensions in  Privacy Law (2006, CUP, Andrew Kenyon and Megan Richardson, eds) 184, 185. 
35  Jane Norton, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’, (2004) 10 AULR 
245, 249.  
36  Rishworth et al, n. 15 above, 104.  
37  Lepofsky M D, ‘Making Sense of the Libel Chill Debate: Do Libel Laws Chill the Exercise of 
Freedom of Expression?” (1994) 4 NJCL 168, 197. 
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economically, and to maintain self-image and worth. 38 Democratic values are also served 
by defamation law because there is a public interest in not deterring good candidates for 
public office from seeking office by leaving them vulnerable to defamation.39 As to 
freedom of expression, the values underlying it have been identified as its role in 
facilitating the emergence of truth in the marketplace of ideas, in maintaining and 
supporting open democracy, and in promoting the ultimate good of a liberal society where 
citizens are able to say and publish to others what they want as an expression of their 
liberty.40 As part of the common law, defamation develops incrementally, and for it to do 
so without taking account of the Bill of Rights in some way would be to ignore these 
profound forms of public interest,41 would produce distorting effects within constitutional 
law, and would also be seriously out of step with other common law jurisdictions.42 Elias J 
recognised this in the High Court in Lange when she said: ‘The modern law of defamation 
represents compromises which seek to achieve balance between protection of reputation 
and freedom of speech. Both values are important. Both are public interests based on 
fundamental human rights’.43
Unsurprisingly, then, Elias J accepted both arguments about application of the Bill in 
Lange:
 
44
 In my view, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act protections are to be given effect by the Court in 
applying the common law…The application of the Act to the common law seems to me to follow 
from the language of s 3 which refers to acts of the judicial branch of the Government of New 
Zealand, a provision not to be found in the Canadian charter… The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 is important contemporary legislation which is directly relevant to the policies served by the 
common law of defamation. It is idle to suggest that the common law need not conform to the 
judgments in such legislation. They are authoritative as to where the convenience and welfare of 
society lies. 
 
Elias J did not set out a detailed approach to the Bill. However, she saw it as requiring a 
balancing of rights in defamation cases and as allowing the common law to prescribe limits to 
                                                          
38  Ibid, 198. 
39  Tipping J in Lange No 1,   474. 
40  Tipping J in Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1, [233], Rishworth et al, n. 15 above, 309. 
41  See also Joseph, n. 34 above. 
42  See Jane Norton, n. 35 above, 250-252, and Rishworth et al, n. 36 above, 104-105. This is so 
in spite of the differing constitutional arrangements in those jurisdictions. 
43  Lange, n. 19 above, 30.  
44  Ibid,  
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freedom of expression when it is balanced with rights of reputation.45 In carrying out this 
balancing, Elias J considered such broad issues as the value of speech and protection of 
individual dignity,46 whether the Bill can apply horizontally,47 the requirements of the law of 
defamation in New Zealand,48 the different approaches in other jurisdictions, the chilling 
effects doctrine,49 the position and power of the news media,50 the political background,51 
matters relevant to remedies,52 and the state of the privilege defence in New Zealand.53  
Similarly, in the Court of Appeal, the Court endorsed the approach of Elias J to 
horizontality,54 and a balancing of values within the whole of the law of defamation was 
carried out. However, in discussing the Bill of Rights, it was emphasised that ‘principles, 
freedoms, international texts and comparative experience must in the end be assessed in a 
local context.’55
Hence, all of the judgments have a strong comparative element, in which the leading 
Canadian case at the time, Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto
 This language marries independence with a willingness to look outwards. 
56 received attention. In 
Hill, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a defamation award of $1.6m in favour of the 
plaintiff, a Crown lawyer, based on statements made about his behaviour in litigation which 
involved the defendants. The latter, invoking freedom of expression in s 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter, asked the Supreme Court to adopt the malice test applied by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in New York Times v Sullivan,57
                                                          
45 Lange, n. 19 above, 45, discussing s 5 of the Bill, which provides: Subject to section 4 of this Bill of 
Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. 
 which gives priority to freedom of 
expression. In the US, public officers only succeed in defamation claims if they demonstrate 
that the defamatory statement was made either with ``knowledge that it was false or with 
46  Ibid, 31. 
47  Ibid, 32. 
48  Ibid, 32-36. 
49  Ibid, 36-37. 
50  Ibid, 43. 
51  Ibid, 45-46. 
52  Ibid,  
53  Ibid, 43-44. 
54  Lange No 1,  451.  
55  Ibid,  467. In Lange No 2,  a similar, though more specific approach is taken, as the Court was 
revisiting issues referred to it by the Privy Council. 
56  (1995) 126 DLR (4th) 129. 
57  New York Times v Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'' The Hill Court declined to change 
Canadian law at that point, in spite of the Charter.  
The Court of Appeal in Lange distinguished Hill and explained that the elements relevant 
to public interest which might have prompted a change in that case were missing. Hill did 
not involve the media or political commentary about government policies or figures, the 
change asked for was a radical change to the common law, and the Hill court was seen as 
rightly cautious in the circumstances. However, the New Zealand Court observed a hint of 
a sea-change in Canadian defamation law, from a narrow approach taken by the Supreme 
Court in the 1950s and 1960s in cases involving political leaders, contrasted to more recent 
decisions of provincial Courts of Appeal where it had been given a wider role.58
Tipping J, who wrote a separate but concurring judgment in Lange No 1, focused on the role 
of a responsible press in particular. For this judge, rights go with responsibilities and he is 
sceptical about the exercise of those responsibilities.
 It will be 
apparent from the discussion of Torstar below that this hinted change detected by the New 
Zealand court was more than accurately identified. 
59 Although Justice Tipping indicated he 
would like to impose a reasonableness requirement on the extended defence in New Zealand, 
and was worried the balance might be wrong without it, he did not do so in the end.60 He 
hoped that the provision in s 19 of the Defamation Act that the defence is lost where there is 
ill will or taking advantage of the ability to publish would allow some examination of the 
issue of reasonable care.61 The language of responsibility was used repeatedly by this judge: 
‘Responsible journalists in whatever medium ought not to have any concerns about such an 
approach…qualified privilege is not a licence to be irresponsible.’62
                                                          
58  Lange No 1, 448, 450-452.  
 This approach means that 
in New Zealand a publisher who has not checked sources, or perhaps not obtained the other 
side of the story, may find it hard to assert a genuine belief in the material, and the issue of 
recklessness or carelessness can be raised. Therefore, media methods may be investigated in 
New Zealand, but at the stage after the occasion of publication is said to be privileged, where 
the plaintiff wants to suggest s 19 of the Defamation Act should apply to deprive the media 
59  Ibid, 473. 
60  Ibid, 474-5. 
61  Ibid, 475, 476-477. 
62  Ibid, 402. 
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defendant of the defence because of ill will. As already stated, this is in contrast to the 
approach taken in the United Kingdom.63
Lange did not produce a new defence to defamation claims. While it has come to be seen as 
momentous, the Lange courts did not want to be seen to be actually changing the common 
law. Although Justice Elias was inclined to take a position which was sympathetic to the 
media, in the end, she tempered her approach with caution. While prepared to adjust the 
balance between freedom of speech and protection of reputation as a value judgment, 
informed by local circumstances and guided by principle,
  
64 Elias J acknowledged that 
whether there is a need to provide additional protection for the media turned in part on a 
sociological assessment of the vulnerability or power of the news media and that a Court may 
not be sufficiently informed about that.65 She therefore ultimately directed that the two 
defences pleaded in the interlocutory application, extended qualified privilege and political 
discussion, be pleaded as one – qualified privilege. A new defence of political discussion was 
not pursued in the Court of Appeal. However, in that court, Tipping J directly addressed the 
issue of change to the common law in this manner: ‘But if this Court is to develop the law of 
qualified privilege, it must be a bona fide development, and not the creation of a new defence. 
While the line can be fine, development is the prerogative of the common law, while creating 
a new defence is the prerogative of the legislature’.66
2.4 Developments since Lange 
 Thus, the Lange defence remains part of 
qualified privilege. 
It will be obvious that the Lange litigation is the strongest recent example of development of 
the common law of defamation in New Zealand, and this has been motivated by concerns 
about freedom of expression. I have argued that the development has been influenced, though 
not ultimately determined, by the Canadian Charter and Charter jurisprudence. However, 
Lange privilege has been slow to consolidate and grow from there, with only a few 
significant reported cases so far, years apart. Nonetheless, indications are that the defence has 
potential to grow into a true public interest defence. I turn now to outline these developments, 
and then the relevant contemporaneous developments in the United Kingdom.  
                                                          
63  See also  the discussion below at 2.5.  
64  Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22,  43. 
65  Ibid, 44. 
66  Lange No 1,  473.  
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In the only Court of Appeal decision on the defence, Vickery v McLean67 the Court was asked 
to extend the defence beyond the limited subject matter of discussion about past, present or 
future Members of Parliament. It refused to apply the defence to statements about local 
council employees, but the judgment contains obiter dicta that it might apply to local as well 
as national politicians.68
More recently, Osmose New Zealand v Wakeling
 As many predicted, the subject matter of the defence is apparently 
open to expansion. However, the Court also stated a limitation, that allegations of serious 
criminality did not attract the defence, because they should not be disseminated too widely. 
Overall, the judgment is cautious. 
69
The judge made a strike out order, because he was in no doubt that the articles published by 
the newspapers were published on an occasion of qualified privilege, and that the 
broadcasters which published would be protected by the defence of qualified privilege if the 
plaintiff had sued them directly. Harrison J found the articles were published on occasions of 
qualified privilege because the material published was of public concern. This was based on 
the fact that New Zealand has significant home ownership, and in recent years has had to 
confront a high national incidence of leaky homes suggesting some systemic failure in the 
building industry which has justified government intervention. Furthermore, the government 
had endorsed Osmose’s product following an inquiry into leaky homes.  
 surprised many commentators, because 
the High Court, in the context of a striking out action, appeared to extend the defence by 
treating it as one of public interest. Osmose made and supplied timber preservative products, 
and it alleged two individuals, Dr Wakeling and Dr Smith, made false and damaging 
statements about those products. Although some of the statements were published in the 
media, unusually, Osmose did not pursue any media interests, alleging instead that the first 
and second plaintiffs were responsible for the chain of publication. However, Wakeling and 
Smith joined Television New Zealand, Radio New Zealand, APN New Zealand and Fairfax 
New Zealand as third parties, in a procedure rarely used for defamation. This decision of 
Harrison J dealt with applications by the media to have the third party notices set aside.  
The finding of public interest appears to break down the limitation imposed in Lange, that the 
subject matter to which the defence of constitutional qualified privilege can apply is 
                                                          
67  Unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 125-00, 20 November 2000. 
68  Ibid, [17], per Tipping J. 
69  [2007] 1 NZLR 841. 
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discussion about politicians, past, present or future. Harrison J did not justify his decision on 
the basis of extending Lange, but spoke instead in generalised terms about public interest, as 
if that were already sufficient to trigger the defence. However, it is a significant jump from 
Lange to Osmose, and the latter does not appear to take the leap on the basis of precedent.  
The other aspect of Osmose which is striking is the treatment of the question of loss of the 
privilege. As outlined above, Lange established that a defendant must not be motivated by ill-
will against the plaintiff, must not take improper advantage of the occasion of publication, 
and should not be reckless, in the sense of irresponsible, in publishing the statements. On the 
question of misuse of the occasion, Harrison J accepted that the content of the publications by 
TVNZ, APN and Fairfax contained a range of views, not just those of Dr Wakeling and Dr 
Smith, and therefore this did not indicate misuse of the opportunity to publish. An alternative 
argument was raised that the media might have known that Dr Wakeling had previously been 
engaged by Osmose’s leading competitor and that Dr Smith was politically motivated. The 
judge thought that such arguments, if accepted, amounted to admitting that the defendants 
themselves had ulterior motives, which would deprive them also of qualified privilege as a 
defence to the main action. A final argument sought to establish that the media third parties 
had published with reckless indifference to the truth or otherwise of the statements of 
Wakeling and Smith. Here the judge considered the defendants faced the same problem of 
being themselves tainted by such arguments, which suggested they were not trustworthy and 
reliable despite being an apparently well-qualified scientist and a senior politician. The judge 
would not deprive the media of the defence. 
Osmose is problematic. Had the plaintiffs in Osmose pursued Dr Wakeling and Dr Smith and 
the media parties jointly, I believe these difficulties with the qualified privilege defence may 
not have arisen. All defendants would have raised the qualified privilege defence, and it 
would have fallen to the plaintiffs, not Wakeling and Smith, to plead particulars of ill will or 
misuse of the opportunity to publish.70 The Defamation Act recognises that the ill will of a 
joint defendant does not infect another so as to lead to loss of qualified privilege,71
                                                          
70  Defamation Act 1992, s 41.  
 and the 
approach of the court should reflect this. Because of the unusual form the proceedings took in 
Osmose, it is arguable the judge treated the behaviour of media and non-media parties as too 
71  Ibid, s 20(2). 
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much alike and in too generalised a fashion – in other words, he failed to give due weight to 
the special position of the media as the fourth estate.  
One other High Court decision deserves mention because it makes comment on potential 
development of Lange. Before I discuss it and Torstar, however, it is necessary to briefly 
consider the position in the United Kingdom. 
2.5 The continuing influence of the ‘old country’ 
I have referred above to the Reynolds case which was decided just before the Lange litigation 
concluded. Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd72  involved an English newspaper article which 
accused former Taoiseach Albert Reynolds of dishonesty. The House of Lords did not adopt 
a generic defence, but went on to hold that the duty/interest test could apply to general 
publication by the media. The scope of the defence was wider than Lange political 
discussion, with Lord Nicholls referring instead to ‘…matters of serious public concern.’73  
This covers such topics as the governance of public bodies, institutions, and companies 
which give rise to a public interest in disclosure, but excludes matters which are personal and 
private.74 Having apparently altered the balance of the law in favour of the media, the House 
directly imposed conditions of care on those claiming the defence by stating a 10 point code 
of journalistic conduct.75 The Reynolds code ossified for a time, unduly restricting the 
usefulness of the defence.76 However, in Jameel v Wall Street Journal,77 the House of Lords 
rejected this inflexible approach. In Jameel, the privilege metamorphised into the Reynolds 
‘public interest’ defence,78 indicating that the material, and not the occasion, is protected, and 
that the defence is being developed with the media in mind.79
                                                          
72   [2001] 2 AC 127. 
 The context of the article as a 
73   Ibid., 204. 
74  Lord Cooke acknowledged in Reynolds that other public figures than politicians exercise 
great power over the lives of people and greatly influence public opinion or act as role models: ibid, 
220. This might even extend to the activities of celebrities. 
75  They were: the seriousness of the allegation, the nature, source and status of the 
information, steps taken to verify the information, urgency of publication, whether comment was 
sought, whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story, the article’s tone,  
and the circumstances of publication: ibid, 205, per Lord Nicholls. His Lordship did emphasise that 
the comments were illustrative only.  
76  See eg: James Gilbert Ltd v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2000] EMLR 680. 
77  [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359. 
78  Ibid, [46], per Lord Hoffman,  [146], per Baroness Hale. 
79  Although it is available to non-media defendants, provided responsibility is exercised: Seager 
v Harper [2008] UKPC 9. 
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whole is used to determine public interest,80 so if an allegation is serious, the article has to 
make a real contribution to that.81 The next question is still whether steps taken to gather the 
information were responsible and fair, but the 10 Reynolds criteria are pointers only, not a 
series of hurdles to be overcome. Weight is to be given to the professional judgment of the 
editor or journalist in the absence of evidence of any slipshod approach.82
Thus, in the United Kingdom, one inaccurate fact in a generally true article might not be 
irresponsible.
  
83 Regard is had to matters such as the steps taken to verify information and the 
opportunity to comment. In Jameel, the article published about the use of bank accounts to 
channel funds for terrorist organisations was clearly of public interest. The other relevant 
factors which confirmed the existence of media responsibility were that the article was 
unsensational, it was by an experienced specialist reporter and approved by senior staff,  and 
although a response was sought at a late stage, it would not have been particularly useful 
anyway.84 Jameel has been described in a later case as ‘…releasing the shackles on the 
freedom of expression afforded to the media in matters of public interest.’85
Reynolds privilege is also apparently beginning to subdivide into further special forms in the 
United Kingdom – the first of these is called neutral reportage or simply reportage. This 
manifestation of the defence is very attractive, because if certain conditions are met, the 
journalist need not have attempted to verify. In Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing 
(UK) Ltd
 
86 the defendant was a small newspaper with a circulation of 1500 in London, part-
owned by the Saudi-Arabian royal family, and supportive of the Saudi Arabian government, 
which reported a dispute between prominent members of a Saudi-Arabian dissident political 
organisation. The report stated that the reporter had been told by one party that the other had 
spread malicious rumours and allegations of immoral behaviour about him. The Court of 
Appeal held by majority that Reynolds privilege could protect a report of defamatory 
allegations and counter-allegations where attribution was clear, the matter was of proper 
interest to the reader, and the reporter did not adopt the allegations.87
                                                          
80  Jameel, n 77 above,  [48] per Lord Hoffman, [111] per Lord Hope. 
 In a case of true 
81  Ibid, [51].  
82  Ibid, [33], per Lord Bingham. 
83  Ibid, [34]. 
84  Ibid, [35] 
85  Charman v Orion Group Publishing Ltd [2008] 1 All ER 750, [71], per LJ Ward. 
86  [2001] EWCA Civ 1634. 
87  Ibid, [65], [67] and [68]. 
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reportage, for example, where a political dispute is fully, fairly and disinterestedly reported, 
the reporter need not even verify the information.88
The Court of Appeal went on to apply the doctrine in a case called Roberts v Gable,
 
89 where 
Ward LJ clarified the following requirements:90
• the information must be in the public interest; 
  
• in a true case of reportage there is no need to take steps to ensure the accuracy of the 
published information; 
• the report as a whole must simply set out in a neutral fashion the fact that something 
has been said without adopting the truth; 
• the judge rules objectively on the effect of the article as a whole, by looking at all of 
the circumstances relevant to the gathering of the information, in particular, the 
manner and purpose of reporting; 
• if the journalist adopts the report or fails to report in a fair, disinterested and neutral 
way, the only possible defence will be Reynolds responsibility; 
• the Reynolds responsibility factors are still relevant, adjusted as may be necessary for 
the special nature of reportage, and looked at in all the circumstances; 
• reportage can protect serious allegations as well as scandal-mongering – reported 
criminality does not automatically require verification, but may be relevant to the 
question of public interest;  
• relevant factors properly applied include the position of the protagonists in public life 
but there is no requirement that the defendant be a responsible prominent person or 
the claimant be a public figure as required under US law;  
• urgency is relevant to the weight given to editorial decisions, but every story must be 
judged on its merits at the moment of publication. 
The Court accepted that in this case, Mr Gable was merely reporting conflicting positions 
arising from allegations and cross-allegations of criminal offences being made by British 
National Party factions against each other, and not necessarily their truth or falsity. This was 
so in spite of the use of one sarcastic reference in the article, because a whole, it did not adopt 
                                                          
88  Ibid, [52]. Arguably, in fact, verification is inconsistent with the objective reporting required. 
89  [2007] EMLR 457. See also Mr Justice Eady in Prince Radu of Hohenzollen v Marco Houston & 
Sena Julia Publications Ltd [2007] EWHC 2735. 
90  Ibid, [61]. These points are paraphrased. 
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any position to the allegations, and the sarcasm was judged to be speculative.91 The article 
was also responsible in terms of the 10 Reynolds factors.  Crucially, however, Sedley LJ 
commented that neutral reportage must modify the repetition rule, and so should be used 
restrictively.92
Finally, Charman v Orion Group Publishing Ltd
  
93 was celebrated as the first case where 
Reynolds responsibility was argued successfully by a book publisher.94  The decision also 
contains an excellent explanation of the difference between an ordinary Reynolds public 
interest defence and reportage. The latter was not available to the defendant book publishers 
because the author of a book ‘Bent Coppers’ had written an investigative account or ‘inside 
story’ of police corruption, by ‘sniffing out information like a bloodhound’, rather than acting 
as a ‘watchdog barking to wake us up to the story already out there’.95 Working methodically 
through the 10 media conduct requirements, although not required to, Ward LJ observed the 
parties had accepted the public interest element in the very serious allegations made, and 
found the author had used varied sources, and had taken all steps possible to verify the 
information.96 The claimant had rebuffed attempts to get his side of the story, but in any 
event, this was contained in the book. The tone of the book was essentially factual in context 
and unsensational. Readers were left to form their own impression. The circumstances of the 
publication were not relevant. However, while there was no urgency as for newspapers or 
broadcasters, this criterion did have some relevance. The book was not a ‘perishable 
commodity’, but the lack of urgency was taken into account and actually weighed against the 
defendant, because greater care is to be expected of authors and publishers in such 
circumstances.97 However, Sedley LJ refused to engage in a retrospective editorial function, 
and held that even though the book was a selective and evaluative account, it was within the 
bounds of responsible journalism.98
                                                          
91  Ibid, [66]. 
 
92  Ibid, [74]. See  Torstar, 3.4 below. 
93  [2008] 1 All ER 750. 
94  See eg: Ward LJ, [83]: ‘I see no reason at all for confining responsible journalism to 
newspapers and magazines. It must be extended to the authors and publishers of books.’ 
95  Ibid, [49]. 
96  Sedley LJ agreed in 4 paragraphs: ibid, [88]-[91]. Hooper LJ used a very close textual analysis 
to conclude that the defendant had engaged in responsible journalism: ibid, [92]-[259]. 
97  Ibid, [83]. 
98  Ibid, [90]. 
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This on-going refinement of the public interest or responsible journalism defence, and the 
further fracturing of it into an even more specialist defence such as reportage, represent a sea-
change in English defamation law which must mediate any real chilling effects existing in 
that jurisdiction. These are changes to substantive law which provide more accessible 
defences for the media. Although they require responsible media behaviour, it appears the 
question of responsibility is now being dealt with in the United Kingdom in a manner which 
is realistic and cognisant of media interests.  
2.6 Responsible journalism and neutral reportage in New Zealand  
Our highest courts have not considered since Lange whether the common law in New 
Zealand should follow the Reynolds line of development.99 However, I conclude this section 
by noting a recent decision of the New Zealand High Court where an argument that the 
principles of responsible reportage and neutral reportage be adopted in New Zealand was 
rejected. In Peters v Television New Zealand100 various media had published reports 
concerning allegations about Mr Peters contained in an affidavit which had been tabled in 
Parliament. Some years after filing the claim, Mr Peters sought leave to file a notice that he 
intended to allege the defendants were motivated by ill will or took improper advantage of 
the occasion of publication (and would thereby lose defences of qualified privilege). TVNZ’s 
counsel argued that refusal to grant leave would not be a miscarriage of justice for Mr Peters 
because the broadcasts and Website articles published by media were clearly covered by 
qualified privilege in the sense of the public interest defence developed in Reynolds, or its 
special form of neutral reportage. Justice Andrews rejected this and found no support in 
Lange No 2 for neutral reportage in New Zealand because Lange required the occasion and 
subject matter to qualify, while Roberts v Gable requires merely that the fact of an allegation 
be reported. The judge stated: ‘I am bound by the Court of Appeal’.101
                                                          
99  See APN Ltd and TVNZ Ltd v Siminovich Fisheries [2009] NZSC 93, [31].  
  This is literally true.  
However, Jameel and Roberts v Gable were decided post-Lange, and our superior courts 
must continue to examine the overseas experience. If Mr Peters continues his action, the 
matter of any extension of the defence can be raised again at the substantive hearing, and the 
body of overseas law, which now includes Torstar, is quite compelling. I turn now to 
examine the Canadian case.  
100  Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CIV 2004-404-003311, 1 October 2009, Andrews J.  
101  Ibid, [48]-[49].  
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3. The Canadian experience – Torstar 
Given the incorporation of freedom of expression values into the law of defamation in 
Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, it is somewhat surprising that Canadian 
jurisprudence, which has exerted influence on our rights discourse, has been lagging behind. 
Torstar has changed all that, and in some areas, gone further, in part by seizing on and using 
the experience in the other common law jurisdictions.  
3.1 Rights-talk 
The Torstar decision102is a model of clarity and pragmatism. In it, the Supreme Court of 
Canada modified the common law of defamation by creating a public interest defence which 
it called ‘responsible communication on matters of public interest.’103 The case arose from 
statements contained in an article published by a newspaper about a private golf course 
development which Mr Grant proposed to carry out on a large lakefront property on the Twin 
Lakes, Ontario. The article reported the views of local residents criticising the development 
and expressing suspicion that political influence had been exercised behind the scenes by Mr 
Grant. One resident was quoted saying ‘Everyone thinks it’s a done deal…’. The reporter had 
attempted to verify the facts and had sought comment from Mr Grant, who did not 
respond.104
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, who visited New Zealand in 2003 as the New Zealand 
Law Foundation’s Distinguished Visiting Fellow, delivered the judgment for the Supreme 
Court. The Chief Justice has pointed out that the Charter emphasises the need for courts to 
reconcile individual rights with a strong Canadian tradition of collective and group rights. 
She refers to the balancing test used in Canada to do this, which is borrowed from European 
thinking. Under the Oakes test, government limitations on individual rights are only justified 
if there is a pressing and substantial reason for the limit, and the incursion is proportionate in 
the sense of being rationally connected to the reason, does not unreasonably impair the right, 
 Mr Grant sued the reporter, the newspaper and its affiliates and the resident 
quoted in the piece.  
                                                          
102  Grant v Torstar Corp 2009 SCC 61, 22 December 2009. 
103  Ibid, [7], [65],  
104  Ibid, [8]-[17]. 
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and on balance, produces more benefit than detriment.105
We see this reflected in the Torstar case. Canadian judges are more used to rights talk than 
New Zealand’s, in part because our Bill of Rights is younger and is not supreme – it is like 
the Bill of Rights which preceded the Charter in Canada. Of that Bill, Chief Justice 
McLachlin has said that it effected only modest advances, and further, that ‘a bill of rights 
may not amount to much unless it is interpreted and applied in a meaningful way.’
 Thus, Charter decisions come down 
to a critical balance between individual rights and the broader public interest.  
106
3.2 Change – the arguments from principle 
 
Therefore Torstar contains much more rights talk than Lange, in particular when looking at 
the case for changing the law.  
The Supreme Court looked first at the arguments from principle. The prior question as to 
whether the Charter should apply to private law was answered in a similar, though more 
powerful manner than was accepted in the Lange case – ‘The constitutional status of freedom 
of expression under the Charter means that all Canadian laws must conform to it. The 
common law, though not directly subject to Charter scrutiny where disputes between private 
parties are concerned, may be modified to bring it into harmony…’107 Holmesian theory 
about the common law is also embraced. Thus ‘the courts will, from time to time, take a fresh 
look at the common law and re-evaluate its consistency with evolving societal expectations 
through the lens of Charter values.’108
The three core rationales behind free speech theory are then examined in the judgment – the 
argument from democracy, the Millian ideal of the marketplace of ideas, and the contribution 
to self-realisation of the individual. The first two are accepted as engaged where the media 
reports on matters of public interest, as is the argument that the existing Canadian defamation 
defences might have a chilling effect on political and democratic speech. This is weighed 
against the competing value of protecting reputation and in a complementary sense, privacy. 
The plaintiffs had made an argument that altering the defence to some form of responsible 
 
                                                          
105  ‘Constitutions as Civic Conversations: Canada and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,’ in A 
Canadian Judgment – The Lectures of Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin in New Zealand, April 2003, 
(The Centre for Commercial & Corporate Law Inc, 2004) Eds Andrew Stockley and David Rowe, 52, 
referring to the test in R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.  
106  Ibid, 50. 
107  Torstar, [44].  
108  Ibid, [46]. 
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journalism would shift the focus in defamation from truth or falsity to the behaviour of the 
defendant, thus obscuring the plaintiff’s purpose. The Court rejected this, stating that libel 
law takes a balanced approach in reflecting both plaintiff and defendant interests.109 
Arguments about the costs of litigation being increased were also unsuccessful. The 
pragmatism of the Court is apparent in its negation of procedural objections and in its stated 
desire to create a defence that is workable and fair to both parties.110 It concludes ‘[w]hen 
proper weight is given to the constitutional value of free expression on matters of public 
interest, the balance tips in favour of broadening the defences available to those who 
communicate facts it is in the public’s interest to know.’111
3.3 Change – jurisprudential arguments 
 
The Supreme Court then turned to a jurisprudential analysis. It found that a comparative 
analysis of case law developments in the other common democracies supported the same 
outcome. The analysis involved looking at the situation in the USA, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Of New Zealand, the Court notes that we rejected 
the Reynolds idea of journalistic responsibility playing a role in the scope of privilege 
because it appeared to detract from the role of the jury and would add to uncertainty in the 
law which would itself have a chilling effect. The Lange outcome is seen as being narrower 
as to scope of privileged subject matter, but as perhaps offering stronger protection overall. 
Ultimately, though, New Zealand is lumped in with the other non-US jurisdictions in taking a 
middle path with a defence which allows ‘publishers to escape liability if they can establish 
that they acted responsibly in attempting to verify the information on a matter of public 
interest.’ This middle path is chosen by the Canadian court also. Using Charter language, the 
decision is ‘buttressed by the argument from Charter principles…[and] represents a 
reasonable and proportionate response to the need to protect reputation while sustaining the 
public exchange of information that is vital to modern Canadian society.’112
                                                          
109  Ibid, [47]-[57]. 
 
110  Ibid, [64]. 
111  Ibid, [65]. 
112  Ibid, [86]-[86]. 
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3.4 The elements of the defence 
The Court then clarified the nature of the defence in more detail, using the prior comparative 
analysis. First, the defence is to be new and separate from the traditional qualified privilege 
defence, in part because it is not the occasion which is protected, but the published material, 
and because qualified privilege was seen as based on social utility, rather than free speech 
values.113 Second, to ensure adaptability to new media, the defence is to apply to responsible 
communication on matters of public interest and is not tied to any concept of publication.114 
The question of public interest is not to be determined in isolation, but in the context of the 
publication as a whole. No single definition of public interest is offered. However, it is not 
confined to discussion of government or political matters. The subject matter must invite 
public attention or substantially concern the public because it affects the welfare of citizens or 
attracts considerable public notoriety or controversy. Some segment of the public must have a 
genuine stake in knowing about the matter. This element is not to be characterised 
narrowly.115
The judgment then deals with the factors which will be relevant to whether a public interest 
defamatory communication is made responsibly. The factors are the seriousness of the 
allegation, the public importance of the matter, the urgency of the matter, the status and 
reliability of the source, whether the plaintiff’s side of the story was sought and accurately 
reported, whether including the defamatory statement was justifiable, whether the statement’s 
public interest lay in the fact that it was made rather than its truth (reportage) and a catch-all 
category of other considerations where relevant. The list is stated differently from that used in 
Reynolds although on the whole it probably covers much the same ground. Where it does 
differ is in creating the category ‘other’. The Supreme Court does not think the issue of tone 
will always be relevant and therefore, it has become an occasional factor only. 
  
A significant change, the effects of which are unclear, is the statement in Torstar that under 
the defence, a jury will no longer have to settle on a single meaning as a preliminary matter. 
Instead, responsibility is to be assessed in relation to any range of meanings the words are 
capable of bearing. This means that arguments about meanings are confined to the defences 
                                                          
113  Ibid, [88]-[95].  
114  Ibid, [96]-[97].  
115  Ibid,  
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of truth and honest opinion and the prior approach whereby the defendant’s intention as to 
meaning is irrelevant is no longer of universal application.  
The recognition of reportage is, however, one area of significant overlap with UK law. In 
adopting this form of the defence, Torstar is significant in confronting clearly the issue of 
how it has altered the rule that repeating a defamation is just as unlawful as the original 
publication it is based on. The judgment makes it clear that the repetition rule is necessary in 
an internet age, but simply will not apply in relation to the public interest defence in the 
exceptional circumstances of reportage. So where it is found that there is public interest in 
reporting what was said in the context of a dispute, and the report makes attribution 
preferably with identification, acknowledges it has not been verified, both sides of the dispute 
are set out fairly and the context is given, the repetition rule is cast aside. The judge is to 
instruct the jury on this exception when applicable.116
Finally, Torstar deals with the roles to be played by judge and jury. Under Canadian law, the 
judge is to decide whether a statement is on a matter of public interest and therefore attracts 
the defence, and the jury decides on the evidence whether the defence is successful, using the 
relevant factors, including whether there was justification to include defamatory statements in 
the article. Maintaining a central role for the jury is in contrast to the situation in the United 
Kingdom, where Reynolds left the jury to determine primary facts only, and the judge to 
make the actual decision on responsibility. Kenyon’s empirical research has revealed that 
English juries can be required to make numerous detailed factual determinations, ‘all on tiny 
bits of fact about who said what, what was the journalist told and did the journalist phone 
twice to check or only once’, with the answers then being ultimately interpreted by judges.
  
117 
The Supreme Court wished to avoid such difficulties arising at trial. Therefore, under 
Torstar, juries decide whether communication has been responsible in light of any meanings 
the words can reasonably bear, and can take the defendant’s intention as to meanings into 
account in the assessment.118
                                                          
116  Ibid, [119]-[121]. 
  
117  Andrew Kenyon, ‘Lange and Reynolds Qualified Privilege: Australian and English Defamation 
Law and Practice, [2004] MULR 13. 
118  Ibid, [127]-[135]. 
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4. Conclusion – Torstar’s Influence on New Zealand Law 
Torstar has the potential to continue the process of reciprocal enrichment of the common law 
I identified at the outset. Of course, it may do this in either a negative or a positive manner, in 
the sense that New Zealand’s superior courts may either adopt or reject elements of the 
decision into our own law. Back in 2003, Tobin suggested that the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal had responded rather defensively to Reynolds in Lange No 2 in refusing to develop 
New Zealand law along the same lines. She suggested that the subject matter of the defence, 
at least, be enlarged.119 Further analysis of the Osmose case120
4.1 Public interest 
 demonstrates why I hold the 
same view.  
The case against the media was settled in Osmose, but in spite of the lack of detailed 
reasoning in the High Court judgment about the question of public interest, I do support this 
aspect of it. This is because if more than lip service is to be paid to freedom of expression, the 
political discussion defence should not be interpreted in a restrictive way. There was genuine 
public interest in the Osmose publications, and the topic of leaky buildings is exactly the sort 
of subject matter to which the defence should be extended in New Zealand, thus drawing our 
law closer to that in the United Kingdom and Canada. It was accepted in Lange that our 
media is more responsible than that in the United Kingdom, and so it is incongruous for our 
law to be more restrictive of freedom of expression than that jurisdiction.  
Lange qualified privilege is an embryonic public interest defence. It is clear that the 
confinement of subject matter as outlined in Lange cannot be maintained on a principled 
basis, and in any event, is beginning to break down. The principled reasons for privileging 
statements about national or local politicians, for wishing to protect against potential chilling 
effects of defamation law in relation to that sort of discussion, must be the basic arguments 
about freedom of expression recognised in Torstar – the arguments from democracy and the 
marketplace of truth ideal. But those arguments also support a wider public interest defence.  
Further, Torstar recognises that the issue is one where freedom of expression is placed at the 
centre of the analysis, rather than as an add-on or afterthought, because of Charter values. 
                                                          
119  Rosemary Tobin, ‘Political Discussion in New Zealand: Cause for Concern’, [2003] NZLRev 
215. 
120  See the discussion at 2.4 above. 
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Our courts are beginning to more explicitly recognise the values flowing from our own Bill 
of Rights, itself modelled on the Canadian experience. I have argued elsewhere that our 
courts need to carry out a more explicit Bill of Rights analysis in cases involving the private 
law which nonetheless trigger human rights such as freedom of expression.121
Finally, as a matter of practical reality, it is clear from my ongoing discussions with media 
throughout the country that Lange is regarded as a public interest defence and is being argued 
as such in informal settlements in threatened defamation claims. 
 Torstar is an 
excellent example of how this might be done, in a straightforward, non-technical fashion. 
4.2 Responsible communication 
As to the conditions in which the Lange defence may be lost, I contend that a series of 
guidelines such as those in Torstar can and should be developed within the New Zealand 
approach of relying on s. 19 of the Defamation Act after a finding that occasion is privileged. 
Very few cases have tested any aspect of this in our jurisdiction. Certainly, nothing has ever 
been put to a jury. However, I think Osmose demonstrates that some guidelines would assist 
in the application of the provision. The High Court in that case allowed the character of the 
originator of allegedly defamatory statements to determine the question of irresponsibility of 
the media, when it is the specific behaviour of the media, made up of a number of elements, 
which should determine the issue. Lange made it very clear that the privilege must be 
responsibly used: ‘There is no public interest in allowing defamatory statements to be made 
irresponsibly – recklessly – under the banner of freedom of expression’.122
Arguably the Court in Osmose got the application of s 19 wrong. It was prepared to accept 
that none of the media third parties conducted any inquiries, yet in spite of this, they were 
entitled to the defence.  Even reputable parties are perfectly capable of getting things horribly 
wrong, so it may clearly be irresponsible not to check the reliability of sources. The Court of 
Appeal has recently noted that qualified privilege ‘is concerned with the terms and 
  
                                                          
121  ‘The Chilling Effect – Defamation and the Bill of Rights’, Law, Liberty, Legislation: Essays In 
Honour of John Burrows QC, LexisNexis, (2008, J Finn and S Todd, eds). 
122  Lange No 2, at [48]. More recently, In Simunovich, the Court of Appeal noted that where 
media repeat what is said by others, many more people are likely to think badly of a plaintiff, partly 
because they will assume the media would not have reported unless there was something in the 
story: n. 99 above, [90]. Although the Court was discussing the repetition rule in this context, this 
observation also supports principled development of the media responsibility limb of the Lange 
qualified privilege defence. 
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circumstances in which the defamatory statement came to be repeated.’123
The question of the full content of guidelines and how judges and juries should deal with 
them in New Zealand will have to wait for another day, but the Torstar list is a good starting 
point for the discussion, and the United Kingdom jury experience is also instructive. The 
concern of the Lange courts that explicitly imposing responsibility requirements will further 
chill defamation law by adding to the cost and length of trials can be met by observing that 
effective implementation of s 19 of the Defamation Act requires this anyway. Recklessness 
and carelessness are behavioural judgments which can only be made using a fact-specific 
circumstantial analysis. Guidelines are very effective in this context, and coincidentally 
provide Bill of Rights’ transparency as well. 
 Therefore, the 
reputation of the defendants should be but one feature of what must be a multi-facetted 
inquiry. The question which should have been asked by the High Court in Osmose was not 
how apparently reputable the defendants were, but what it was reasonable for the media in 
question to do in all of the circumstances. The issues which should also have been considered 
were the degree of public interest in the story and any risk of public alarm it might cause, the 
risk to the commercial and reputational interests of the plaintiff, and how easy it would be to 
check accuracy and get the other side of the story. These aspects would be covered by the 
guidelines in Torstar.  
4.3 A stand-alone defence? 
As to whether the defence would be stand-alone, rather than remaining part of qualified 
privilege, again, lack of space prevents a full analysis being carried out in this conclusion. I 
simply note here that although I have proposed a series of guidelines dealing with media 
responsibility which would not disturb the current position of the defence as a sub-set of 
qualified privilege, if the subject matter is extended and the defence becomes one of public 
interest, then, as suggested in Torstar, it begins to look less and less a specialised part of 
defamation law and more like a rights-based defence. Given that there is increasing scope for 
parallel development of such a defence in the law of privacy, a stand-alone defence is more 
logical.  
4.4 Reportage 
                                                          
123  Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television New Zealand Ltd [2008] NZCA 350, [92]. 
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Finally, I think adopting the concept of reportage is a good idea too. Although successful use 
of this particular manifestation of a public interest defence would be rare given the general 
character of media reporting currently, it is a defence which encourages both media 
responsibility and full reporting, thus serving freedom of expression while illustrating exactly 
the sort of ‘rights with responsibilities’ approach our judges appear to be interested in. It does 
require recognising an exception to the repetition rule, but this is acceptable given that the 
defence should only apply in rare, well-defined circumstances when all conditions are met.   
4.5 The future 
What then, is the future for New Zealand defamation law? Claims both here and in the United 
Kingdom appear to be declining.124 In New Zealand, there is also ample anecdotal evidence 
that defamation is becoming less of a concern to the media than the developing tort of 
privacy.125  Furthermore, Palmer goes so far as to suggest that the tort of defamation might 
even fall into disuse in the next 30 years, as a relic of a previous media age.126
I think it more likely that significant distinctions between defamation and privacy may begin 
to disappear,
  
127
                                                          
124  Professor Dame Hazel Genn, ‘Civil Justice Reform and the Role of ADR’, Paper delivered as 
New Zealand Law Foundation Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Christchurch, 17 September 2009. 
Reform of procedural rules has led to a decline in civil claims generally. One media lawyer has 
commented that the decrease in defamation claims may have occurred because the UK media is 
much more used to interacting with its audience and dealing with complaints as they arise: See 
‘Fewer libel cases reaching a verdict’, guardian.co.uk, 9 October 2008,  
 while the use of these torts continues to decline. The orthodox understanding 
has been that defamation provides a remedy for untrue statements while privacy provides a 
remedy for true intimate statements. Common law judges have the power to take the 
emphasis off the truth or untruth element in each tort and put it instead on the public interest 
defence based on responsible journalism. If these torts implode in this fashion, what do we 
have then?  One possibility is the ascension of rights-based jurisprudence, in the form of a 
www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/oct/09/medialaw.pressandpublishing  See also Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding observations of the 
Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee, Ninety-third session, Geneva, 7-25 July 2008, 
GE.08-43342 
125  This non-empirical observation is based on my regular discussions with New Zealand media 
representatives. 
126  Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer, ‘The Law of Defamation in New Zealand – Its Recent Evolution 
and Problems’, Law, Liberty, Legislation: In Honour of John Burrows QC, LexisNexis, (2008),  339, 357. 
127  Judge Patrick Moloney QC has commented that in future it is likely an increasing number of 
claims will be brought jointly in both causes of action: ‘Privacy: The New Libel?’, Protecting the 
Media 2008, IBC Conference, (UK) 1 September 2008. 
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claim for loss of autonomy, dignity and integrity, based on either publication of true or untrue 
facts, which may be defended on the basis of public interest. The latter would clearly be 
satisfied if the material contributes to an important public debate or the functioning of a 
democracy, and the communication involved is responsible. Such an outcome is entirely 
possible in both New Zealand and Canada, and in both jurisdictions, distantly-related Bills of 
Rights will have played a fundamental role in the process, as well as comparative 
jurisprudence. 
